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771 
DO AUTOMOBILE PASSENGERS HAVE A LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY?  AN ANALYSIS OF 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
People v. Howard1 
(decided May 9, 2011) 
 
The defendant, Dustin Howard, was arrested when the police 
observed a revolver in the car, in which he was a passenger.2  Howard 
was ultimately convicted of attempted criminal possession in the 
fourth degree.3  The defendant sought to challenge the search of the 
vehicle and seizure of the gun on Fourth Amendment grounds that 
“the officer‟s directive that the vehicle be moved, transform[ed] what 
might otherwise be a mere investigatory approach to a stationary ve-
hicle into a full-blown vehicle stop.”4  The criminal court denied the 
defendant‟s motion to suppress the evidence, and the appellate term 
affirmed, holding that defendant failed to meet his burden of proving 
that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched ve-
hicle.5 
 
 
1 928 N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Term 2d Dep‟t 2011). 
2 Id. at 158. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in pertinent part that 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Similar-
ly, New York‟s Constitution reads in pertinent part that “[t]he right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .”  N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12. 
5 Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 158.  The court also relied on the fact that the car was not in a 
lawful location at the time of the initial approach by police, and the vehicle was not stopped 
by police.  Id. 
1
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Defendant was a passenger in an illegally parked car that was 
obstructing traffic on a one-way street.6  As the police approached the 
vehicle, an officer asked the vehicle operator to move the car.7  The 
operator, who was outside of the vehicle, responded by asking the de-
fendant, who was the rear-seated passenger, to move the car out of 
the way.8  After the defendant drove the car to a legal space, the of-
ficers asked for identification and permission to search the car.9  Si-
multaneously, another officer saw a gun on the floor of the car where 
defendant was originally seated.10  At that point, the police officers 
arrested the defendant, the other passenger in the vehicle, and the 
original operator of the vehicle.11 
After he was “convicted of attempted criminal possession of a 
weapon in the fourth degree,”12 the defendant challenged his convic-
tion alleging that the order to move the car amounted to a Fourth 
Amendment seizure of his person and, therefore, conferred standing 
on him to challenge the seizure and resulting search of the vehicle.13  
The defendant based his claim that he was subject to a Fourth 
Amendment14 stop, as the driver, or alternatively, as the passenger in 
the car.15  The defendant also alleged rights under a New York statu-
tory presumption of possession, which would automatically provide 
him with standing to challenge the stop and search of the car.16 
 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 158.  The request to search the car was denied.  Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 159. 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The constructive possession statute in New York is N.Y. 
PENAL LAW §265.15 [3] (McKinney 2011).  Although defendant attempted to claim this pre-
sumption it was not the basis of the prosecution‟s complaint against him (attempted con-
structive possession, N.Y. PENAL LAW §10.00[8] (McKinney 2011)) and was quickly set 
aside by the court as irrelevant in his case.  Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 159. 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  N.Y PENAL LAW §265.15 [3] is a constructive possession statute that states: 
The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omni-
bus, of any firearm, large capacity ammunition feeding device, defaced 
firearm, defaced rifle or shotgun, defaced large capacity ammunition 
feeding device, firearm silencer, explosive or incendiary bomb, bomb-
shell, gravity knife, switchblade knife, pilum ballistic knife, metal 
knuckle knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, plastic knuckles, 
2
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The court began its analysis in Howard, with the fact that the 
initial police observation and approach of the car was legal and prop-
er because the police were conducting a mere investigatory ap-
proach.17  The issue came down to whether the police order to move 
the vehicle amounted to a stop and seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment.18  The court began with the basic premise that a passenger may 
challenge the constitutionality of a police stop and the search of a ve-
hicle.19  However, the court also noted that “a mere passenger in a 
vehicle already stopped has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the vehicle‟s interior.”20 
The United States Supreme Court enunciated the current rule 
of passenger standing to challenge a Fourth Amendment violation as 
a factor-driven test in Rakas v. Illinois.21  The Court in Rakas was 
specifically concerned with the ability of a car passenger to challenge 
a search of a vehicle in which a rifle and shells were seized.22  The 
Court held that the passengers did not have standing to challenge the 
search because they did not claim property or possessory rights to the 
car or in the items seized.23  The Court‟s ruling effectively estab-
lished the rule that a mere passenger in a car has no standing to chal-
lenge a search of the vehicle‟s interior without some legitimate ex-
 
metal knuckles, chuka stick, sandbag, sandclub or slungshot is presump-
tive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile 
at the time such weapon, instrument or appliance is found, except under 
the following circumstances: (a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance 
is found upon the person of one of the occupants therein; (b) if such 
weapon, instrument or appliance is found in an automobile which is be-
ing operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, lawful and 
proper pursuit of his or her trade, then such presumption shall not apply 
to the driver; or (c) if the weapon so found is a pistol or revolver and one 
of the occupants, not present under duress, has in his or her possession a 
valid license to have and carry concealed the same. 
17 Howard, 928 N.YS.2d at 158-59; see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (hold-
ing police shining flashlight into Brown‟s stopped vehicle did not trigger Fourth Amendment 
protections); People v. Valerio, 710 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (App. Div. 4th  Dep‟t 2000) (holding 
police possessed objective and proper reason to approach car because it was illegally double 
parked). 
18 Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 159. 
19 Id. (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255-56 (2007)). 
20 Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978)). 
21 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
22 Id. at 129. 
23 Id. at 148. 
3
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pectation of privacy therein.24 
The Court in Rakas stated that to have standing there are “two 
inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a particular legal right has 
alleged „injury in fact,‟ and, second, whether the proponent is assert-
ing his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for 
relief upon the rights of third parties.”25  The Court stated that to de-
termine whether the Fourth Amendment protects an individual it is 
necessary to determine “whether the disputed search and seizure has 
infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment 
was designed to protect.”26  The determinative factor is whether the 
individual has “a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded 
place.”27 
The Court then explained that the expectation is not only a 
subjective expectation, but also one that is objectively reasonable, 
based upon society‟s willingness to recognize that expectation as rea-
sonable.28  Factors to be considered in this analysis, according to the 
 
24 Id. at 130-31.  With this decision, the Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 
(1978).  The defendant in Rakas argued that Jones applied to him because the search was 
directed or aimed at him or, in the alternative, that he was “ „legitimately on [the] premises‟ 
at the time of the search.”  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. 257).  The test that 
had been established in Jones was that to establish standing a person must have some pos-
sessory interest in the property searched, or the target (person aggrieved) by the search to 
establish standing.  Jones, 362 U.S. at 264.  The Court in Rakas, merely adopted this rule as 
one of the many factors to establish whether there is standing.  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. 
25 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133, 139; see also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 
(1969) (citations omitted) (holding “we adhere to . . . the general rule that Fourth Amend-
ment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vica-
riously asserted.”); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (citations omitted) 
(reaffirming Fourth Amendment rights are individual in nature). 
26 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140. 
27 Id. at 143. 
28 Id. at 143 n.12.  This standard was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  In Katz, the FBI listened to the defendant‟s pri-
vate telephone conversation in a public phone booth with an electronic listening device.  Id. 
at 348.  The Court distinguished between what a person knowingly shows to the public, 
which is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, and what a person seeks to keep private.  
Id. at 351 (citations omitted).  This analysis considers actions that an individual takes to pre-
serve their privacy that may trigger Fourth Amendment protections.  Id. at 352.  The Court 
concluded in Katz that, given the circumstances, there was a subjective expectation of priva-
cy of the individual in the telephone booth, because the individual takes steps to protect the 
telephone conversation, which includes walking into a phone booth, shutting the door behind 
them, paying the fee to place the call, uttering words into the receiver, with the expectation 
that it will not be broadcast to the world.  Id. 
4
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Court, included property rights, whether the person is the owner, 
whether the person may exclude others, and control over the proper-
ty, which the Court also noted that, all of which, may not be enough 
if there is no particular expectation in a specific location.29 
Passenger standing in the vehicle context was extended by the 
United States Supreme Court in Brendlin v. California.30  The Court 
held that a passenger may challenge the constitutionality of a traffic 
stop because they are seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.31  The Court reasoned that passengers are seized be-
cause they are halted when the police perform a traffic stop, and that 
any reasonable person would not feel free to leave without the per-
mission of the police.32  The Court concluded that because a passen-
ger has standing to challenge the legality of the stop, if the police 
conduct is unreasonable or exceeds the permissible scope of police 
action, then the passenger may object to those constitutional viola-
tions and have any evidence found in the car suppressed.33  To deter-
mine this, the Court will examine the legality of the initial stop, the 
length of time elapsed, and if an occupant has been removed from the 
vehicle.34 
In Brendlin, the defendant challenged the seizure of his per-
son and the search of the car because there was no reasonable suspi-
cion for the police to stop the vehicle.35  The police had observed the 
car with an expired registration.36  However, when the officers called 
into dispatch, they learned that a new registration was requested and 
that it was legal to drive the car as is.37  The police then proceeded to 
pull over the vehicle, despite the fact there was no reasonable suspi-
cion with regards to the car.38  After approaching the car, the police 
officer recognized Brendlin, the front-seat passenger, as a parole vi-
 
29 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. 
30 551 U.S. 249 (2007). 
31 Id. at 251. 
32 Id. at 255, 257. 
33 Id. at 259 (citation omitted). 
34 Id. 
35 Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 253. 
36 Id. at 252. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
5
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olator and arrested him.39  A subsequent search of the car resulted in 
incriminating evidence of illegal drugs.40  Applying the reasonable 
person test, the Court determined that any reasonable passenger, un-
der the circumstances, would have felt that they were under police 
control and were not free to leave the situation at their will.41  The 
Court concluded that Brendlin was seized when the car was pulled 
over and remanded the case to the state supreme court.42 
Vehicles are treated differently under the law than real prop-
erty in the context of standing to challenge a Fourth Amendment 
search.43  In Minnesota v. Olson,44 the Court held that an overnight 
guest may have a legitimate expectation of privacy depending on the 
circumstances.45  The Court held that Olson‟s Fourth Amendment 
rights had been violated when the police arrested him.46 
In Olson, the police executed a warrantless arrest against Ol-
son in a duplex he was staying in as an overnight guest.47  Subse-
quently, Olson made an incriminating statement at the police station, 
while under arrest, that he moved to suppress as tainted by the illegal 
arrest.48  The Court held that Olson had an expectation of privacy 
 
39 Id. 
40 Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 252. 
41 Id. at 257. 
42 Id. at 263. 
43 See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974) (citations omitted) holding that: 
“The search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected 
by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one‟s person or of a build-
ing.”  One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because 
its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as 
the repository of personal effects.  A car has little capacity for escaping 
public scrutiny.  It travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and 
its contents are in plain view.  “What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”  This is not to say that no part of the interior of 
an automobile has Fourth Amendment protection; the exercise of a de-
sire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one‟s right to be free of un-
reasonable government intrusion.  But insofar as Fourth Amendment 
protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the 
touchstone of our inquiry. 
44 495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
45 Id. at 98. 
46 Id. at 93. 
47 Id. at 94. 
48 Id. at 94-95. 
6
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similar to that of an owner of the dwelling, and that it was one society 
would deem reasonable.49  The Court decided that a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy is not limited to the absence of the true owner of 
real property.50  According to the Court, a guest does not need com-
plete dominion and control over the place to be searched to have his 
or her Fourth Amendment rights violated.51 
In its analysis, the Court in Olson, evaluated the reasonable-
ness of the defendant‟s expectation of privacy as an overnight guest 
against the objective standard society deems acceptable.52  The Court 
stated that a host‟s overnight guest is a longstanding social custom, 
and that at one point or another, every individual will be a host, or a 
guest, and that no matter which way one looks at it, society does rec-
ognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in another‟s home in those 
circumstances.53  The Court reasoned that the guest is there because 
of the advantages of keeping personal effects and possessions in the 
host‟s home and there is an expectation that the home is private 
enough not to be interfered with, even when one is sleeping.54  Fur-
ther, the Court reasoned that a host shares privacy with a guest, and is 
likely to honor that sphere of the guest even though there is no legal 
interest in the property, because a guest will have some control over 
the premises when the host is not present or asleep.55 
In Minnesota v. Carter,56 the Court applied the standing fac-
tors from Olson, and held that the rights of the defendants were not 
violated because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the premises.57  The defendants did not live in the apartment, and the 
only reason for being present at the apartment was for the illegal 
commercial activity of packaging cocaine.58  The Court reasoned that 
 
49 Olson, 495 U.S. at 100. 
50 Id. at 98-100. 
51 Id. at 98. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Olson, 495 U.S. at 99. 
55 Id. 
56 525 U.S. 83 (1998). 
57 Id. at 85.  The Court also noted that the defendants were present in the apartment for 
only a couple hours, and had never had any previous ties to the apartment.  Id. at 86.  A po-
lice officer observed the illegal activity through a crack in the window blinds from outside 
the apartment, and defendants claim this was an unreasonable search.  Id. at 85-86. 
58 Id. at 86. 
7
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the apartment was used for commercial reasons, it was not their 
home, and nothing indicated that the defendants had a significant 
connection to the apartment.59  Therefore, the Court stated that the 
defendants were merely permitted to be present in the apartment, 
which did not give rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy.60 
New York precedent has largely relied upon and followed 
Rakas v. Illinois in order to determine standing to challenge a Fourth 
Amendment search.61  The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Di-
vision, Second Department, has stated that “[a] passenger in an auto-
mobile has standing to challenge the admissibility of any evidence 
seized as a result of an alleged illegal stop.”62  This rule has been ap-
plied in a variety of vehicle stops under New York law. 
For example, in People v. Madera,63 the court held that the 
defendant, who was a passenger in an illegal stop, had standing to 
challenge and move to suppress evidence as a result.64  The court rea-
soned that the police did not have a legitimate reason to stop the ve-
hicle, because it was driven in accordance with the law, with the 
permission of a family member of the owner, and none of the indi-
viduals in the car were engaged in suspicious activity at the time the 
car was pulled over.65 
The standing rule of a passenger to challenge the legality of a 
stop has also been extended in New York beyond Rakas.  For exam-
ple, in People v. Millan,66 the court held that a taxicab passenger had 
standing “to contest the legality of the stop of the cab and to seek 
suppression of the weapon as the product of that allegedly unlawful 
 
59 Carter, 525 U.S. at 90-91. 
60 Id. at 91.  Also, note the Court evaluated precedents set forth in Jones, 362 U.S. at 265, 
and Rakas, 439 U.S. at 135, and concluded that “[A]n overnight guest in a home may claim 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of 
the householder may not.”  Carter, 525 U.S. at 89-90. 
61 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
62 People v. Dawson, 496 N.Y.S.2d 273, 274 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1985). 
63 509 N.Y.S.2d 36 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1986). 
64 Id. at 37. 
65 Id. 
66 508 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 1987).  In contrast, the court in People v. Ocampo, 492 N.Y.S.2d 
695, 698 (Sup. Ct. 1985), held that a passenger does not possess standing to challenge an 
unreasonable search and seizure if there is no possessory interest in the items seized or the 
places searched. 
8
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police conduct.”67 
Fourth Amendment standing and the individuality of this right 
are highlighted even further in New York precedent when it comes to 
the vehicle operator‟s ability to challenge a stop and/or a resulting 
seizure.68  In People v. May,69 the court held that the driver of a stolen 
car had standing to challenge the illegal stop of the car and subse-
quent search, because he was stopped based on the officer‟s suspicion 
of May‟s conduct.70 
In May, the police observed a car parked on the side of a road 
in the early morning hours.71  When the police pulled up behind the 
car the defendant began driving away, which prompted the police to 
use a loudspeaker to order the car to pull over; and the defendant 
complied.72  When the officers called in the tags on the car, they were 
advised it was a stolen vehicle, and a subsequent search revealed 
drugs and a tampered steering column that was rewired.73  The court 
reasoned that, given the circumstances, the police did not have a legal 
basis for the stop at the point they ordered the car to pull over, and 
that the defendant was stopped personally, which conferred the right 
to challenge the search and seizure.74 
Further, in People v. Voner,75 the court held that even the 
driver of a car who disclaimed ownership of the vehicle has standing 
to challenge an illegal stop by the police.76  In Voner, the police were 
acting on a tip from a confidential informant that later turned out not 
 
67 Millan, 508 N.E.2d at 904.  Although the prosecution had charged the defendant with 
the statutory presumption of possession N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15[3] (McKinney 2011), the 
court nevertheless reaffirmed that passengers nonetheless have standing to challenge an il-
legal seizure and any resulting search as fruits of the illegal stop.  Id. 
68 See People v. May, 609 N.E.2d 113, 114 (N.Y. 1992) (holding car thief possessed 
standing based on officer‟s individualized suspicion of driver); People v. Voner, 904 
N.Y.S.2d 225, 227 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2010) (holding disclaimer of ownership did not ne-
gate driver‟s Fourth Amendment standing); People v. Cacioppo, 479 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265 
(App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1984) (holding occasional use of another‟s vehicle insufficient to estab-
lish standing). 
69 609 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1992). 
70 Id. at 114. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 May, 609 N.E.2d at 114-15. 
75 904 N.Y.S.2d 225 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2010). 
76 Id. at 227. 
9
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to give rise to probable cause under the Aguillar-Spinelli test.77  The 
government argued that the defendant did not have standing to chal-
lenge the search, because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy, 
because he denied ownership of the seized vehicle.78  The court stated 
that standing to challenge a search of a vehicle was separate from the 
right to contest the validity of a seizure and the defendant had the 
right to seek suppression on those grounds.79 
In People v. Cacioppo,80 the court held that the occasional use 
of a vehicle did not give rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy.81  
In Cacioppo, the defendant had an agreement with the vehicle owner, 
that in exchange for $100 per month, the defendant would have occa-
sional use of the car.82  The facts in the case revealed that the owner 
exercised dominion and control over the car because it was registered 
in his name only, and he kept the keys to the car.83  Further evidence 
showed that the owner, the owner‟s spouse, and the defendant used 
the vehicle, and the doors were kept unlocked.84 
Based on these facts, the court in Cacciopo determined that 
the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy be-
cause he was not the owner, the doors were not locked at the time of 
the search, and he did not have his own set of keys to the vehicle.85  
The court also noted that the defendant failed to allege that he exer-
cised dominion and control over the vehicle by attempting to exclude 
others.86   
Although, New York precedent is broader in some aspects of 
 
77 Id. at 226, 228.  The Aguillar-Spinelli test was a two-part test that established criteria 
for police to rely on informant information that required the police to confirm an informant‟s 
reliability and veracity.  Aguillar v. Texas, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1513-14 (1964), overruled by Illi-
nois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).  In Gates, the United States Supreme Court 
adopted a “totality of the circumstances” test instead.  Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. 
78 Voner, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 227. 
79 Id. 
80 479 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1984). 
81 Id. at 265-66. 
82 Id. at 265.  The owner of the vehicle corroborated the defendant‟s interest and legal 
claims in the vehicle and testified that he also allowed the defendant to store drugs in the car 
for an additional $25 per week.  Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Cacioppo, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 265. 
85 Id. at 266. 
86 Id.  Which the court also stated would help his argument that he possessed standing.  Id.  
Rather, the court noted that there was free access to the vehicle.  Id.  
10
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standing, it also places limits on passenger standing in an already sta-
tionary vehicle.  The court in Howard stated that the police: 
did not so interfere with defendant‟s freedom of 
movement as to convert what otherwise was an indis-
putably lawful approach to a stationary vehicle based 
on a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation into a vehicle 
stop.  The vehicle “was stationary prior to, and for a 
reason independent of, the action of the police,” and 
because its illegal placement attenuated defendant‟s 
privacy interests, it cannot be said that the order to 
move the vehicle implicated the Fourth Amendment 
concerns associated with such stops.87 
The legal implication of this language is that in an already stopped 
vehicle that aroused suspicion by the illegal placement, gives rise to 
lowered expectation of privacy therein. 
The New York Court of Appeals established the above legal 
principle in People v. Ocasio.88  In Ocasio, the police approached a 
vehicle that was stopped at a traffic light in which Ocasio was a pas-
senger.89  The police tapped on the window of the car, and asked for 
identification.90  Ocasio provided a wallet to the officer that was not 
his own.91  This aroused police suspicion, and led Ocasio to consent 
to a search by the police for weapons.92  A subsequent inventory 
search of the vehicle led police to discover a weapon and stolen cash 
from the true owner of the wallet that the defendant handed to po-
lice.93 
The court in Ocasio distinguished the rule of law between the 
 
87 Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 159 (citations omitted); see also People v. Ocasio, 652 
N.E.2d 907, 908 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that standard to determine whether seizure occurred 
was “whether a reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, that the 
officer‟s conduct was a significant limitation on his or her freedom.”); People v. Thomas, 
792 N.Y.S. 2d 472, 476 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1995) (holding parking in front of and blocking 
defendant‟s car by police did not escalate intrusion upon defendant because his vehicle was 
already stopped). 
88 652 N.E.2d 907 (N.Y. 1995). 
89 Id. at 908. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Ocasio, 652 N.E.2d at 908. 
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stop of a moving vehicle as opposed to that of a stationary one.94  For 
a parked car, the police only need an objective credible basis to ap-
proach a car.95  Then to determine whether a seizure has occurred it is 
a reasonable person standard, whether a person would feel free to 
walk away from police.96  The court in Ocasio, found that the police 
requests were nonthreatening requests for basic information, which 
resulted in a continued consensual encounter with the defendant, 
which did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.97 
The courts in New York have also examined the ability of an 
overnight guest to challenge a police search of a dwelling or home, 
similar to the federal precedent on this topic.  In People v. Rodri-
guez,98 the New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant had 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in an apartment that police 
searched and found illegal drugs.99  The defendant‟s ties to the 
apartment were rather tenuous; he went to the apartment to buy 
drugs, was sleeping on a sofa bed when the police arrived, and he 
may have stayed there several times before.100  The court stated that 
in order to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place 
searched, the expectation must be “reasonable in light of all the sur-
rounding circumstances.”101 
The court in Rodriguez considered several factors to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy including: 
“whether the individual took precautions to maintain privacy, the 
manner in which the individual used the premises and whether the 
individual had the right to exclude others from the premises”102  The 
court stated that a mere possessory interest is no longer sufficient by 
itself, and must be considered in conjunction with the time spent by 
 
94 Id. (citing People v. May, 609 N.E.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. 1992); People v. Harrison, 443 
N.E.2d 447, 450-51 (N.Y. 1982)). 
95 Id. (citing Harrison, 443 N.E.2d at 450).  A moving vehicle requires the police to have 
a minimum of reasonable suspicion to justify a police stop and seizure.  Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Ocasio, 652 N.E.2d at 909 (citing People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 
1992)). 
98 505 N.E.2d 586 (N.Y. 1987). 
99 Id. at 587. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 588.  According to the court, reasonable is also based on what society is willing 
to recognize as a privacy interest.  Id. (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153). 
102 Rodriguez, 505 N.E.2d at 588. 
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the individual in a particular place, the purpose for the individual‟s 
stay in the place that is searched, and included considerations of the 
degree of  connection to the apartment, such as clothing, expenses or 
other household chores.103  The court, applying these factors, deemed 
the defendant a transient, with no sense of an objective or subjective 
expectation of privacy in the apartment that was searched.104 
Also, in People v. Stanley,105 the defendant was convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance, despite his contention that he 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment that was 
searched.106  The defendant had forced the lawful tenant out of the 
apartment, did not have a lease, and did not pay rent.107  The court de-
termined that there was no legally recognizable expectation of priva-
cy in the apartment, because “any subjective expectation of privacy 
[the defendant] manifested in the apartment was not objectively rea-
sonable.”108 
The New York Appellate Term‟s decision in People v. How-
ard, appears to be in line with what is now well-settled Fourth 
Amendment law established under Federal and New York State pre-
cedents.109  Pursuant to the Federal and New York State Constitu-
tions, individuals are protected against unreasonable searches and 
seizures in their persons, places, and effects.110  The federal and New 
York courts have interpreted this language to protect more than just 
tangible items and to include things such as private conversations.111  
Furthermore, the protections against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures have gone far beyond property rights to establish standing to 
challenge such a search.112  Rather, a property interest is no longer 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 589. 
105 856 N.Y.S.2d 221 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2008). 
106 Id. at 222. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 222-23. 
109 Federal and New York precedent are almost identical because the respective constitu-
tions, U.S. CONST. amend. IV., and N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
110 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
111 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348 (applying Fourth Amendment protections to individual in 
public telephone booth); N.Y. CONST. art I, § 12 also states that “The right of the people to 
be secure against unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall 
not be violated . . .”). 
112 See generally Jones, 362 U.S. at 264-65 (holding person aggrieved by search may have 
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dispositive in this area of law and is now just one of many factors in 
the test announced by the Supreme Court in Rakas.113 
Specifically, in the context of stopped vehicles, there are two 
ways to establish standing.114  One way to establish standing, is to 
challenge the legality of a traffic stop by the police, which according 
to Brendlin, a passenger may contest.115  The second way to establish 
standing is to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
location that is searched, which according to Rakas, must be one that 
society is prepared to accept as legitimate.116 
In Howard, the defendant did not try to claim a privacy inter-
est in the car to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy.117  Ra-
ther, Howard attempted to claim that, as the driver of the car or as the 
passenger, the police stop was not legitimate and, therefore, it was il-
legal.118  However, Howard failed to take into consideration the sur-
rounding circumstances of the initial police observation and approach 
of the vehicle.119  The police‟s observation that the car was illegally 
parked prompted the police to request that the car be moved, which 
subsequently led to the plain-view observation of the gun.120  Given 
the circumstances, the police did not seize the car and, therefore, did 
not confer standing upon Howard to challenge the alleged stop and 
search of the car.121   
Further, the United States Supreme Court has found that a ve-
hicle is merely a tool to travel, within plain view of outside eyes 
looking inward, and, therefore, it is harder to find an objective expec-
 
standing or person may assert some possessory interest in property); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 
n.12 (holding traditional concepts of property do apply; however, in the alternative, a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy may also be based on what society is willing to recognize as le-
gitimate or objectively reasonable); Katz, 389 U.S. at 348 (holding Fourth Amendment pro-
tected an individual‟s private telephone conversation in public telephone booth); Rodriguez, 
505 N.E.2d at 586, 587 (applying Fourth Amendment analysis to another‟s home in context 
of overnight guest). 
113 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-43 (citations omitted). 
114 Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 259 (citation omitted); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (citations 
omitted). 
115 Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 259 (citation omitted). 
116 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (citations omitted). 
117 Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 159. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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tation of privacy in such places that society is willing to recognize.122  
This line of reasoning appears to make sense given the circumstances 
of ordinary travel or commute.  However, individual expectations 
may vary greatly.  It would appear that in cases such as Howard, that 
either the individual has to be acting, for lack of a better word, un-
wise, or that they possess a subjective expectation of privacy in a ve-
hicle from outside eyes.  No matter which conclusion one comes to, 
there is one thing that is clear - individuals must take steps to protect 
their privacy in vehicles, just like they would to protect their privacy 
in a dwelling.  Otherwise, an individual is deemed to have waived his 
or her expectation of privacy, which is half the battle of challenging a 
search or seizure, and no legally recognizable right exists in terms of 
standing. 
 
Lisa Belrose  
 
 
122 Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590-91 (citations omitted). 
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